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Croatia has undergone significant infrastructural changes since 
the 1990s. The difficult process of transition to statehood caused 
far-reaching consequences of unemployment, increase of 
domestic and foreign debt, and growth of systemic corruption. In 
2010 the Croatian Parliament amended the Constitution and 
abolished the statute of limitations for privatization and ownership 
transformation crimes committed during the Homeland War and 
peaceful reintegration. The abolition of the statute of limitations 
enabled Croatian justice to prosecute former Prime Minister Ivo 
Sanader for his part in war profiteering during the early 1990s, 
with the result that he was sentenced to long-term imprisonment 
in the Hypo bank case. However, in 2015 the Constitutional Court 
overruled this ruling, arguing that the abolition of retroactivity 
cannot be applied to those criminal offences for which the statute 
of limitations has expired before the Constitutional amendment 
entered into force. This decision made all criminal proceedings 
against war profiteers legally impossible, since in almost every 
case the statute of limitations had already expired in 2010. In this 
text, authors will analyze the decision of the Constitutional Court 
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in the Hypo bank case, critically examining the reasoning of the 
Constitutional Court in the context of historical interpretation of 
the nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege principle – as 
one of the most esteemed values of enlightenment philosophy – 
concluding with an explanation of their own standpoint on the 
topic.     
Key words: statute of limitations – abolition – principle – 
legality – Hypo bank case – Croatian constitution 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
OF THE CASE 
The dissolution of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY), a state union which stretched across the Western part of the Balkan 
peninsula with a population of over twenty million, started during the eighth 
decade of the twentieth century. The death of the unparalleled political leader, 
Marshall Josip Broz Tito (1980), and the ensuing high inflation rate with the 
devaluation of the currency, as well as a general economic crisis, gradually led 
to social and political unrest, which eventually caused the dissolution of this 
large and once very influential country. This process resulted in bloody wars, 
first in Croatia and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The unsustainability of the then existing economic system was visible even 
during the eighth decade of the twentieth century. At the time, there was a 
growing awareness in Croatia and Slovenia of the market economy system. 
This marked the introduction into the processes of economic transformation and 
privatization. The economic transformation represented legal transformation of 
previous community property into property with clearly determined owners 
(private or state). The privatization process represented selling state property to 
private entities (Josipović, 2018, pp. 197 – 199). Croatia has opted for a market 
economy in its Constitution from 1990, which enacted a package of laws 
accommodating the implementation of the process of economic transformation 
and privatization. Although this process was well designed in essence, it failed 
miserably in practice. Instead of serving as a transition instrument from a 
socialist to a capitalist society, the privatization process was used as a tool for 
the unjustified enrichment of a small group of people who had close 
connections to the top ranks of the Croatian Democratic Community party 
(CDC). Marked by the absence of transparency and a strong political influence, 
the privatization process hindered the economic growth of the country and had 
a dissuasive effect on potential foreign investors, which directly caused the 
deterioration of the country’s economic structure (Gregurek, 2001, pp. 155). 
Croatian literature does not contain systematic criminological studies which 
would contribute to the determination of the exact number of criminal offences 
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related to the economic transformation and privatization, as well as wartime 
profiteering, which is usually reviewed in this context. It can only be assumed 
that the number of crimes in this area is considerable. A series of judicial factors 
also contributed to the situation, including long and inefficient criminal 
proceedings, as well as a small number of verdicts for such cases. Drawing a 
parallel with Durkheim’s anomie theory, Novoselec, Roksandić Vidlička and 
Maršavelski rightfully note that Croatia was in a state of anomie at the time, 
which led to the creation of innovative forms of unjust enrichment through the 
privatization process (Novoselec, Roksandić Vidlička and Maršavelski, 2015, 
p. 201).  
Considering the described situation and its long-term negative consequences 
for the economic stability of the Croatian society, and acknowledging the 
justified interest for sanctioning those responsible for such a situation, the 
founders of the Croatian constitution undertook a daring constitutional reform 
in 2010. Propelled by the array of legal reforms, with the common goal of a 
final reckoning of systematic corruption, the Parliament adopted a 
constitutional amendment according to which criminal offences related to 
economic transformation, privatization and wartime profiteering were elevated 
to the level of the most severe crimes (such as genocide and war crimes) by 
eliminating their statute of limitations (Article 31 Paragraph 4 of the 
Constitution).  
A contentious question was whether this amendment could be applied to the 
criminal offenses whose statute of limitation had already elapsed at the time of 
the adoption of the Constitutional amendment or whether the statute of 
limitations could no longer be derogated in such cases. To clarify this issue, a 
special Law on the Elimination of the Statute of Limitations for Criminal 
Offenses of Wartime Profiteering and the Criminal Offenses and Process of 
Economic Transformation and Privatization was enacted in 2011. This Law 
clearly opted for the possibility that the elimination of the statute of limitations 
would apply equally to the specified criminal offences, regardless of whether 
their statute of limitation had already elapsed. The legislator allowed expressis 
verbis the application of the elimination of the statute of limitations to all such 
criminal offences, even in cases where the lapse of the statute of limitations was 
previously determined by a binding court decision (Novoselec and Novosel, 
2011, pp. 603 – 620). This would have been the final resolution on this matter, 
if not for the decision cited in title of this paper: the decision of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia in the “Hypo Bank” case. In 
this decision, the Constitutional Court took a position which was contrary to the 
expressed will of the writers of the constitution and the legislature. Considering 
the role of the Constitutional Court, which was defined in the structure of the 
Croatian judicial system, this decision imposed significant legal consequences 
for all future trials. This is even more evident considering the political 
implications of the “Hypo Bank” case, as the case was against the formerly 
powerful Prime Minister of Croatia, Ivo Sanader. The following sections 
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contain the chronology of the “Hypo Bank” case, the analysis of the decision 
of the Constitutional Court regarding the issue of limits to the elimination of 
the statute of limitations and our critical reflections on this significant issue. 
 
2. THE HYPO BANK CASE - FACTS AND CHRONOLOGY 
In the following section we will explain the circumstances and the chronology 
of the entire Hypo Bank case, starting with the indictment, through the first 
instance and appellate decision, to the decision of the Constitutional Court and 
the ensuing repeated trial. We will also provide a closer insight into the 
reasoning of the decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the scope of the 
retroactive application of the elimination of the statute of limitations for 
wartime profiteering and criminal offences related to economic transformation 
and privatization.  
2.1.  Overview of the facts and chronology of the “Hypo Bank” case 
Ivo Sanader was the Prime Minister of Croatia for two terms, from 2003 to 
2007 and from 2007 to his abrupt and never fully explained resignation in 2009, 
after his second mid-term. In the Hypo Bank case, he was accused of wartime 
profiteering which he allegedly committed during his time as the Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, during the years that Croatia was seeking a bank 
which would be willing to provide an affordable loan for the purchase of the 
buildings of Croatian embassies abroad. Sanader was chosen to conduct the 
negotiations for Croatia as Deputy Minister and a person who enjoyed the 
Prime Minister’s trust. This was also due to the fact that he was a fluent German 
speaker, having lived in Austria for years where he obtained his Ph.D. in 
literature in 1982. Thus, the Minister of Foreign Affairs entrusted him to 
conduct these negotiations in their entirety.   
According to the indictment of the Office for Combating Corruption and 
Organized Crime (OCCOC) on August 31, 2011, Sanader was charged for 
arranging an illicit cash provision for himself in the amount of 7 million 
Austrian Schillings (around $580,000) which was ultimately paid by the 
Austrian Hypo Bank, Die Kärntner Landesbank Klagenfurt, with whom 
Sanader was acting as an authorized negotiator for the Croatian government. 
This was done in 1994 and 1995, during the Homeland War, when the Republic 
of Croatia was facing difficulties finding banks which would provide affordable 
loans due to its difficult economic situation. This provision was paid to Sanader 
as a “reward” for allowing the bank’s entry into the Croatian economy. After 
the trial before the County Court in Zagreb, on November19, 2012, Sanader 
was found guilty as charged and convicted to three years and six months in 
prison, with a mandatory confiscation of financial gains in the abovementioned 
amount. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia reduced 
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Sanader’s prison sentence to three years in 2014, but it confirmed the 
conviction. 
Thereupon, Sanader’s legal team filed a constitutional claim to the 
Constitutional Court. In their view, such conduct was a violation of the legality 
principle and the rule of prohibiting the retroactive application of a less 
favorable law (nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege praevia). 
Therefore, the issue that the Constitutional Court was presented with regarding 
Sanader’s claim was: Can the Constitutional amendment of the elimination of 
the statute of limitations for the criminal offences of wartime profiteering be 
applied to the criminal offences whose statute of limitations had already lapsed 
at the time of the adoption of this Constitutional amendment? If the answer to 
this question is affirmative, it would mean that the statute of limitations for such 
criminal offences would be eliminated, and they could once again be 
prosecuted. The practical aspect of this issue is reflected in the fact that, at the 
time of the enactment of the Constitutional amendment, the statute of 
limitations had lapsed for the majority of the relevant criminal offences. 
Therefore, a positive determination of this issue would effectively enable the 
processing of transformative crimes in the judicial practice. On the other hand, 
a negative response would practically preclude the initiation of the majority of 
criminal proceedings and render this constitutional provision into law in the 
books.  
The Constitutional Court reached a decision in this case on July 24, 2015, in 
which it basically accepted Sanader’s arguments. Regarding the issue at hand, 
the Constitutional Court concluded that the constitutional provision on the 
elimination of the statute of limitations cannot be applied to cases for which the 
statute of limitations had already lapsed at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitutional Amendment. In other words, the Constitutional Court 
determined that in such cases the statute of limitations cannot be re-opened. In 
its reasoning, the Court started with the understanding that the legality principle 
represents a minimal guarantee of the defendant’s legal security, which can 
never be derogated, even at the will of the constitutional authority. Here the 
Court relied on a confusing method of combined enumeration of legal 
provisions which should be applied in the given case and the citation of sections 
of various decisions of the Supreme Court and the European Court for Human 
Rights (ECHR). As Josipović rightfully notes, the course of the elaboration is 
not consistent, which makes this decision (immense in volume as it runs to 187 
pages) difficult to follow at times, or to discern what exactly the Constitutional 
Justices had in mind. In addition, certain enumerations are superfluous, and it 
is thus unclear why, for example, the Constitutional Court speaks about the 
mandatory application of the law with the more favorable sentencing 
framework, when the applicant was not objecting to this matter, and this issue 
was not contested at all in this case. 
Furthermore, another confusing factor is the citing of sections of certain 
decisions of the ECHR, which clearly refer to the legality principle, but which 
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the Court failed to place into the context of the specific claim, as it is not 
completely clear what these decisions should refer to. All of this, with the 
abovementioned volume of the decision and the fact that the decision was being 
made on two consolidated cases, contributed to the confusion.   
Considering the central position undoubtedly given to the legality principle in 
the Croatian legal tradition, the Court found that Article 31 Paragraph 4 of the 
Constitution should be interpreted restrictively, which would lead to the 
conclusion that this provision can, under no circumstances, “derogate the 
statutory provisions on statutes of limitations”, because the latter are a “general 
principle of law”, which is accepted by all civilized nations in the world 
(Josipović, 2018, p. 154). In this context, the Court strongly emphasizes the 
practice of the ECHR, which affirms the legality principle as the fundamental 
principle which ensures the principle of the tripartite division of government, 
guarantees the functionality of the criminal legislation and protects from 
arbitrary conduct. Sections of numerous decisions of the ECHR are cited, which 
confirm this thesis, in the view of the Court. It is particularly interesting that 
the Constitutional Court relies on one decision from the American judicial 
practice (which is not typical for courts from the Continental European legal 
tradition), the Stogner vs California case, which is erroneously presented as a 
decision of the US Supreme Court. 
Accordingly, this principle must be continuously “built and implemented” in 
national practice (Josipović, 2018, p. 154).  In the view of the Court, in cases 
related to the issue of the elimination of the statute of limitations for wartime 
profiteering, this should be pursued through three steps: the competent court 
first must establish the existence of sufficient evidence that a specific economic 
crime was committed; thereafter, it should be determined that the statute of 
limitations for this (plain) economic crime itself had not lapsed; only after this 
was established by the competent court, it can proceed to the determination of 
the fulfillment of the requirements from Article 7 Paragraph 1 of the Law on 
the Elimination of the Statute of Limitations, based on which a plain economic 
crime is qualified as wartime profiteering, if the requirements are met 
(Josipović, 2018, pp. 154 - 160). Thus, the Court here suggests that the first 
determination should be whether or not the crime was committed, and only then 
whether or not the statute of limitations had lapsed, which is the reverse logic 
to the one normally applied by courts in the Republic of Croatia. The courts 
usually (and in accordance with the rules) first establish the existence of so-
called procedural impediments to the trial, including the statute of limitations, 
and only then do they proceed to the hearings and decisions on the merits of the 
case (Josipović, 2018, p. 232). 
Considering all the presented arguments, the Constitutional Court accepted the 
objections of the applicant, annulled the decisions of the Supreme Court and 
the County Court, and it remanded the case back to the first instance court 
(which was the County Court in Zagreb). Through this decision, the Court 
brought into question the viability of all current and future proceedings for 
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wartime profiteering and crimes related to economic transformation and 
privatization.   
 
3. CRITICAL COMMENTARY 
The following is a closer reflection on the decision of the Constitutional Court, 
as well as a critical commentary in the following section. In our view, the Hypo 
Bank case creates dilemmas of criminal and constitutional law. The 
commentary of the decision will first analyze it from the perspective of criminal 
law, and then from the perspective of constitutional law. We emphasize that 
both perspectives are equally important.  
3.1.  Criminal law perspective 
There is no doubt that the legality principle is one of the fundamental principles, 
if not the most significant principle, of Croatian substantive criminal law. 
However, one could rightfully ask whether the interpretation of this 
fundamental principle by the Constitutional Court is accurate, or could the 
Court have chosen a “better route” (Ivičević Karas and Roksandić Vidlička, 
2017, p. 241)? 
In our view, the interpretation of this principle, from the perspective of criminal 
law, is in essence based on the wrong premise. The legality principle only refers 
to two components: the criminal offence and the prescribed sentence. This 
undoubtedly arises out of applicable Croatian law. The Constitution itself 
mentions, in Article 31 Paragraph 1, the “criminal offence” and “punishment”, 
while the Criminal Code extends this term to “criminal sanctions”. This is 
logical, taking into consideration that this principle was historically formulated 
as a reaction to the self-will and arbitrariness of the medieval courts, especially 
in determining punishable conduct and the appropriate punishments.    
Croatian criminal law theory clearly defines the scope of the legality principle 
based on the two aforementioned segments. A contrario, which means that this 
principle does not refer to the issue of statute of limitations and that the issue 
of retroactive application of the extended (unfavorable) statute of limitations 
term should not even be considered in relation to the principle of nullum crime 
sine lege praevia, as the Constitutional Court had done. Such an approach is 
erroneous, not only for the previously stated reason, but also because the 
prohibition of the retroactive application can only refer to institutes of a purely 
substantive nature. On the contrary, procedural institutes can be applied 
retroactively. This position was explicitly confirmed by the Croatian Supreme 
Court. The statute of limitations does not have a purely substantive nature in 
Croatian criminal law. As a matter of fact, Krapac invokes the fact that the lapse 
of the statute of limitations leads to a decision of rejecting the claim, which is 
not a decision resolving the merits (substantive issues) of the case. Thus, he 
defines it as a purely procedural institute (Krapac, 2015, p. 48). Other scholars 
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claim that the statute of limitations is an institute of a mixed nature, substantive 
and procedural (Novoselec, 2016, p. 264). We are in favor of this position. The 
argument presented by Krapac is accurate, but it is also true that the statute of 
limitations is provided in the Criminal Code and that it is connected to the 
prescribed sanction, which are both substantive categories. Therefore, if one 
starts with the presumption that the statute of limitations is not an institute of a 
purely substantive nature, then the principle of the prohibition of retroactive 
effects does not apply to it at all. 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the Constitutional Court cites, in several 
instances, sections of various decisions of the ECHR. Josipović warns that the 
interpretation of these decisions by the Constitutional Court is one-sided and 
that the Court only cites the sections of the decisions which support its position, 
and that it interprets them out of context. To the contrary, as noted by Josipović, 
there is no ECHR case law which ties the prohibition of retroactive application 
of the criminal code to the statute of limitations and its term (Josipović, 2018, 
p. 239).  
It can generally be stated that the ECHR has not developed a sufficiently clear 
and consistent jurisprudence on the issue of the prohibition of retroactive 
application of criminal codes (Valentini, 2011, p. 194). It is even notable that 
the ECHR case law related to the legality principle and the limits to the 
interpretation of Article 7 of the EHRC set the opposite trend to the one pursued 
by the Croatian Constitutional Court. The ECHR took the more extensive and 
flexible approach of the Anglo-American concept of the principle of legality. 
A good example of this is one of the landmark cases of the ECHR in this area, 
the S.W. vs. UK case. The applicant in this case was “S”, who was convicted 
for raping his wife in Great Britain, although marital rape was not a crime at 
the time it was committed,due to the existence of the so-called marital 
immunity. The ECHR rejected his argument on the prohibition of retroactivity, 
stating that the conviction of the British courts was “reasonably predictable” 
because it was in accordance with the contemporary public discourse in Great 
Britain, and gender equality in general. 
Novoselec is right to conclude that the Constitutional Court, through the Hypo 
Bank decision, actually modified the will of the writers of the constitution and 
indirectly abolished the previously cited provision of Article 31 Paragraph 4 of 
the Croatian Constitution (Novoselec, 2016, p. 273). The question of whether 
or not the Constitutional Court was authorized to take such a step will be 
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3.2.  Constitutional law perspective 
It is important to note that the first President of the Republic of Croatia did not 
declare war based on the previous decision of the Croatian Parliament. For this 
reason, the constitutional provision eliminating the statute of limitations also 
extends to the term “immediate endangerment of the independence and 
territorial of the country”. Considering the fact that constitutional norms are 
characteristically broad and vague, their further interpretation is realized, as a 
rule, through laws and bylaws (Smerdel, 2013, p. 125). For this reason, the 
concretization of these provisions was done through the enactment of the Law 
on the Elimination of the Statute of Limitations for Criminal Offences of 
Wartime Profiteering and Criminal Offences Related to Economic 
Transformation and Privatization.  
The significance of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Croatia in the Hypo Bank case arises out of several facts. First this decision was 
the first instance in which the Constitutional Court interpreted the constitutional 
norm on the elimination of the statute of limitations for certain criminal 
offences, whereby it took the position which will be followed in future similar 
cases, in accordance with the stare decisis principle (Potočnjak and Stresec, 
2009, p. 209). Another fact is its binding nature for the courts whose decisions 
were overturned in the parts relevant to the legal position taken by the 
Constitutional Court. Therefore, although they are not formally obliged to do 
so, other courts in similar cases will adopt the legal interpretation of the 
Constitutional Court, because they would otherwise risk their decisions being 
set aside.  
The third significant matter is the fact that the Constitutional Court in this case, 
de facto conducted a review of the substantive constitutionality of a 
constitutional norm. Constitutional review of laws in countries of the 
continental European legal tradition, including the Republic of Croatia, is in the 
jurisdiction of constitutional courts and it entails the abstract and direct review 
of the constitutionality of laws. A different approach is taken in the USA, for 
example, where all courts conduct constitutional reviews, but these reviews are 
indirect and case-specific. These differences have significant legal 
consequences (Smerdel, 2013, pp. 136 – 142). According to the existing 
constitutional order, the constitutional review of the provisions of legal norms 
is conducted upon a proposal or request, and not in decisions based on 
constitutional claims. The purpose of filing a constitutional claim is the 
protection of constitutional and convention rights. Furthermore, the 
Constitutional Court concluded in a number of previous decisions that it does 
not have the jurisdiction to evaluate the substantive constitutionality of a 
constitutional provision. 
The accurate position on the constitutional grounds for the decision of the 
Constitutional Court in the Hypo Bank case entails finding the answers to 
several principal self-imposing questions and sub-questions. The first one refers 
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to the possibility of a retroactive effect of a constitutional norm, the second to 
the possibility of interfering with the legality principle with the application of 
the proportionality principle, and the third to the interaction of the highest 
values of the constitutional order, i.e. finding an appropriate balance between 
their inherent demands. Considering the exceptional constitutional significance 
of the highest values of the constitutional order which arises out of their 
function, it should be noted that they could collide in practice. The text of the 
constitution does not explicitly distinguish between them, so the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia has the duty to create certain standards through 
its practice, in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution as a whole and in 
line with the contemporary methods for the interpretation of legal norms.  
The possibility of the retroactive application of a constitutional norm stems 
from the fact that the retroactive application of certain provisions of law is 
allowed in exceptional cases, when there are justifiable circumstances. 
Considering the fact that the constitution sets forth the legal and political order 
and that the constitutional norms are the cornerstone for the enactment of laws 
and all other regulations, it would be logically and constitutionally unacceptable 
to allow the retroactive application of a legal norm of a weaker legal force, but 
to prohibit at least an equal possibility for constitutional norms. Such a position 
would represent a complete inversion of the fundamental principles underlying 
the objective constitutional order in the Republic of Croatia. Furthermore, it 
should be explained whether retroactive application is constitutionally allowed, 
regardless of the specific right and liberty it refers to. The answer to this 
question is negative. The Constitution itself excludes the possibility of limiting 
certain rights and liberties, even during wartime. This includes the right to life, 
the prohibition of torture, cruel or demeaning conduct, the legal determination 
of criminal offences and sanctions, as well as the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.  
These rights and liberties are of absolute character and they cannot be 
derogated. Croatian Constitution stipulates that, even in cases of clear and 
present danger to the existence of the state, no restrictions may be imposed upon 
the provisions of this Constitution stipulating the right to life, prohibition of 
torture, cruel or degrading treatment or punishment, and concerning the legal 
definitions of criminal offences and punishment, and the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (art. 17. par. 3). Therefore, all other rights and liberties 
can be subject to limitations, but only in accordance with the prescribed 
preconditions. The Constitution sets forth three fundamental preconditions. The 
first is the form of the act prescribing the limitation, the second is the existence 
of legitimate goals, and the third is adherence to the proportionality principle. 
Rights and liberties can only be limited through a legal or constitutional norm. 
Although the constitutional norms were not explicitly mentioned as a means for 
limiting rights and liberties. This possibility implicitly arises out of the concept 
of the Croatian constitutional order. The Constitution lays out four fundamental 
legitimate goals – the rights and liberties of others, the legal order, public 
 
The Hypo bank case: How the Croatian Constitutional Court… 
 
Balkan Social Science Review Vol.16, December 2020, 71- 89                     81 
 
morals and health. Finally, the proportionality principle demands a proportional 
relationship between the desired legitimate goal and the severity of the intrusion 
into the constitutionally guaranteed rights and liberties (Palić and Vencel, 2017, 
pp. 490 – 492).  
In addition to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, for an accurate 
assessment of the possibility of encroaching into the proportionality principle 
in criminal law, which is also recognized as an international normative 
standard, the international legal norms which are applicable in the legal system 
of the Republic of Croatia must be taken into account. These are the Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties which was 
ratified by the Croatian Parliament in 1997 and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union which is an integral part of the Constitutional 
Agreement from Lisbon and which entered into force with the accession of the 
Republic of Croatia into the European Union. The Croatian Constitution 
distinguishes between two types of international agreements. The first category 
is subject to mandatory ratification by the Croatian Parliament, while the other 
is signed and enforced by the executive branch, i.e. the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia and the President of the Republic of Croatia. The 
mandatory ratification process is reserved for the international agreements 
which aim to amend legislation, create financial obligations for the Republic of 
Croatia, or those of a military and political nature. Both of the aforementioned 
international agreements were ratified by the Croatian Parliament and have a 
higher legal force than national laws ex constitutione. However, ratified 
international agreements cannot match the legal force of the Constitution 
because, on the one hand, they were not enacted following the procedure for 
the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, and on the other, 
they enter the Croatian legal system on the basis of a constitutional norm. All 
these legal acts contain the legality principle in the realm of criminal law.   
When reaching this decision on the constitutional claim, the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia made a leap in the interpretation of its 
constitutional authority, by assessing the constitutionality of a provision of the 
Constitution itself, which provided for the elimination of the statute of 
limitations for wartime profiteering and crimes related to economic 
transformation and privatization which were committed during the Homeland 
War and peaceful reintegration, wartime and the imminent danger to the 
independence and territorial integrity of the country. The constitutionality 
principle, as one of the fundamental principles set forth by the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia and entails the review of the constitutionality of norms 
of a lower legal force. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in this regard 
is expressly set forth in the Constitution and this normative framework does not 
explicitly allow for the possibility of abstract constitutional review of any 
constitutional norm. Each amendment to the Constitution, regardless if it was 
introduced in the Croatian Parliament or by means of a constitutional 
referendum, has the identical legal effect on the legal force of the new norms 
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which are incorporated into the text of the Constitution. Considering these facts, 
it is unclear why the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia potentially 
stepped outside of the scope of its constitutional authority. In part, the 
Constitutional Court draws the justification for such a position from the 
significance of the highest values of the constitutional order of the Republic of 
Croatia which play a key role in the interpretation of all other constitutional 
norms, including the one eliminating the statute of limitations for certain 
criminal offences. The concept which supports the arguments of the 
Constitutional Court has two main viewpoints.  
According to the first one, the lapse of the statute of limitations has an absolute 
and irreversible effect, which cannot be interfered with subsequently, because 
this would violate the legality principle which is an integral part of the rule of 
law, as one of the highest values of the constitutional order.    
The second viewpoint is purely interpretational, according to which the 
Constitutional Court interprets the will of the constitutional authority. It states 
that only a limited scope of application of the constitutional provision on the 
elimination of the statute of limitations is possible, only for criminal offences 
whose statute of limitations had not lapsed at the time of the enactment of the 
Constitutional Amendment. 
With regard to the first position, the legality principle in criminal law does not 
consist only of the prohibition of retroactive application. The prohibition of 
retroactive application arises out of the necessary protection of the principle of 
legal security, which is an integral part of the rule of law. There are several 
segments of the absolute prohibition of retroactive application, which are 
constitutionalized. The violation of the legal determination of criminal offences 
and sanctions is absolutely prohibited. Otherwise, it would be possible to 
retroactively incriminate and sanction conduct and to pronounce sentences 
which did not even exist at the time the conduct was committed.  This would 
allow absolute arbitrariness in the conduct of the government, as the 
constitution exists precisely to prevent such behavior. The significance of this 
prohibition also arises out of the simple fact that it cannot be encroached in any 
way through the application of the proportionality principle, even during 
wartime or a state of emergency. Furthermore, the Constitution of the Republic 
of Croatia also prohibits the retroactive application of sanctions by prescribing 
the obligation of choosing the more favorable sanction, if it was changed for a 
certain criminal offence during the course of the criminal proceedings. The 
sanction is, without a doubt, a substantive part of the body of a criminal offence. 
The statute of limitations for the initiation of criminal proceedings is not of a 
purely substantive nature. The prohibition of retroactive interference with the 
statute of limitations could only be accepted if the exclusively substantive 
component of the statute of limitations could be consistently defended. 
However, there is no unified or prevailing position in the criminal legal theory, 
which was acknowledged by the Constitutional Court in its reasoning for the 
decision in the Hypo Bank case. If the Constitutional Court held the position 
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that a retroactive intervention into the statute of limitations was not possible, 
then it should have provided additional arguments in support of the purely 
substantive component of the statute of limitations for the initiation of 
proceedings. However, the reasoning for such a decision does not contain any 
such arguments.  
The second position through which the Constitutional Court limited the scope 
of a clearly formulated constitutional provision, from a purely linguistic 
perspective, is particularly debatable for several reasons. Firstly, none of the 
applicable methods of constitutional interpretation could lead to the conclusion 
that the intent of the writers of the constitution was to prevent the lapse of the 
statute of limitations only for the criminal offences which had not occurred at 
the time the revision of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, enacted in 
2010. The linguistic and teleological interpretation can only lead to the 
conclusion that the writers of the Constitution intended to revive the lapsed 
statute of limitations. It is completely paradoxical for the Constitutional Court 
to conclude that this provision only extends to the criminal offences whose 
statute of limitations had not already lapsed. This raises the crucial question: 
why would the Constitution be amended in order to enable the prosecution of 
criminal offences whose statute of limitations had not lapsed? The lapse of the 
statute of limitations is a procedural impediment. If it had not lapsed, there are 
no procedural impediments whatsoever which would prevent the State Attorney 
from conducting legal actions aimed at sanctioning the perpetrators of certain 
criminal offences. It is precisely the conduct of the State Attorney that interrupts 
the course of the statute of limitations, so it is unclear why the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia would be amended to this effect. All of these 
considerations bring into question the logical viability and the legal grounds of 
the position taken by the Constitutional Court in its decision upon the 
constitutional claim in the Hypo Bank case. An additional argument which 
completely annuls the logic and reasoning of the Constitutional Court in 
relation to the second position is the fact that in the period from the beginning 
of the Homeland War until the enactment of the Constitutional Amendment in 
2010 an interim Criminal Code was enacted, according to which the statute of 
limitation had lapsed for all the criminal offences covered by the Constitutional 
Amendment. Therefore, had the reasoning of the Constitutional Court been 
adopted, the Constitutional Amendment would not be applicable to them at all.    
A special law had to be enacted in order to enable the application of the 
constitutional amendment eliminating the statute of limitations, which 
happened in 2011. This law precisely enumerated the criminal offences which 
were subject to this constitutional amendment. 
Therein, three limitations were defined. The first one referred to the timeframe 
within which the criminal offence was committed, i.e. the Homeland War and 
the peaceful reintegration. The Croatian Constitution prescribes the declaration 
of war which is done by the President of the Republic as the commander in 
chief of the armed forces, based on the previous decision by the Croatian 
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Parliament. This decision was formally never issued, but the practice of the 
Constitutional Court established that the Homeland War ended with the 
conclusion of the peaceful reintegration process under the auspices of the 
Organization of the United Nations on January 15, 1998. Criminal offences 
committed after this date could not be subject to the Constitutional Amendment 
on the elimination of the statute of limitations, unless there was another war 
declared or immediate endangerment of the independence and territorial 
integrity of the country. The second limitation, which is fully in line with the 
principle of proportionality in the limitation of rights, arises out of the 
constitutional provision which requires the legal prescription of such criminal 
offences, which precludes their prescription by legal norms of a lower legal 
force. The third limitation stems from the preceding two, because the law 
enumerates some, but not all of the criminal offenses which were prescribed by 
the Criminal Code, i.e. the laws which were applicable during the Homeland 
War.  
In order to reach an appropriate conclusion related to the proportionality 
principle, we must answer the question of whether the legitimate goal, the 
sanctioning of those who obtained substantive benefits during the wartime, can 
be accomplished through the application of a measure more favorable than the 
interference with the statute of limitations. The answer to this question is 
negative. Considering the fact that the lapse of the statute of limitations 
precludes the initiation of proceedings, only the elimination of this fact can 
enable its initiation. There is no other measure or legal mechanism within the 
legal framework of the Republic of Croatia which would have the same effect. 
Thus, the crucial requirements of necessity and proportionality are met in this 
case. Considering the fact that the case at hand weighed the principle of legal 
security and social justice as significant constitutional values, it is our view that 
precedence should be given to social justice. 
Due to the constitutional position of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Croatia and the legal effect of its acts, the consequences of its decision on this 
constitutional claim and the sanctioning of wartime profiteers, which is the 
topic of this text, should be clarified. The general norm defining the binding 
nature of the decisions and orders of the Constitutional Court also applies to the 
decision in the Hypo Bank case. The special norm which applies to the 
proceedings on constitutional claims prescribes the mandatory adoption of the 
position of the Constitutional Court for the specific case. Thus, the legal 
interpretation provided by the Constitutional Court on the constitutional norm 
on the elimination of the statute of limitations for certain criminal offences is 
binding for the courts in the repeated trial, and basically all other courts 
deciding in similar cases.   
Finally, the Constitutional Court, in the analyzed case, essentially modified the 
scope of a certain constitutional norm by limiting its legal effect. Such a move 
is an intrusion into the will of the constitutional authority. We find it indicative 
that the Constitutional Court did not react during the constitutional revision 
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process in 2010, although it formally could have intervened and attempted to 
prevent the enactment of and unenforceable constitutional norm, nor did it 
annul the provisions of the law which restated the constitutional norm on the 
elimination of the statute of limitations in a manner inconsistent with the 
position of the Constitutional Court.   
 
4. CLOSING REMARKS 
The presented analysis indicates how robust the judicial practice in transitional 
countries can be, as well as describe its long-term effects on the affirmation of 
the idea of the rule of law. Placed in the appropriate historical and political 
context, the analysis of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Croatia in the Hypo Bank case demonstrates that the Court both erroneously 
interpreted one of the central principles of criminal law, and exceeded its 
constitutional authority. Although the regular court in the remanded 
proceedings was able to take advantage of the newly created legal gap and to 
issue another guilty verdict, it is highly questionable whether this verdict will 
withstand the likely constitutional review by the Constitutional Court. This 
raises legitimate questions about the selection of Constitutional Court Justices 
and their accountability for the issued decisions, and questioning whether they 
are acting outside of their constitutional authority in reaching those decisions. 
It is our view that the Constitutional Court in Croatia needs to be “cleansed” 
from any type of political influence, which was done for the regular courts. 
Judges are selected by an independent body, the so-called State Judicial 
Council, whose absolute majority consists of professional judges, which 
minimizes any political influence. On the other hand, Justices of the 
Constitutional Court are selected by a two-third majority in Parliament, 
implying the need for consensus from both the ruling and opposition parties in 
order to be appointed. This means that only a person who is politically 
acceptable, as well as legally competent can qualify for such a position. It is 
worth noting in this context that five of the current thirteen Constitutional Court 
Justices were selected among individuals from previous political ranks, 
members of Parliament or ministers. Therefore, it would be useful to preclude 
the reappointment of justices in order to strengthen their independence from the 
political will of the members of the Croatian Parliament, similar to the German 
model. If a rule existed that the term of the justices is ten years, but without the 
possibility of reappointment, with retention of all the currently enjoyed 
privileges, this would certainly contribute to their independence. This would 
also improve the decisions quality of the Constitutional Court, as well as the 
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